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12.1  Introduction 
In the past fifteen years or so, the world has been witnessing a funda- 
mental change in the way the telecommunications industry operates. For 
many countries, introducing competition into the telecommunications in- 
dustry has proved to be much more than allowing additional firms into 
the industry. It requires the transformation of a monopolistic government 
business into a competitive industry, which in turn demands the redefini- 
tion of the role of the government, creation of a proper regulatory regime, 
a new set of rules governing who can participate in what parts of the new 
business opportunity, rules to set rates and access charges, and so on. The 
process of  transformation in Korea has not always been orderly and is 
still unfolding. 
The Korean experience seems to present a unique example of telecom- 
munications deregulation. First, the role of the government has not been 
clearly redefined. The government opted to allow some private firms into 
the telecommunications industry while at the same time retaining control 
of Korea Telecom, which was a monopolistic public enterprise before de- 
regulation.'  Thus the government put itself in a position to provide ser- 
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1. A note on public enterprises in Korea is in order. Public enterprises in Korea differ 
from, say, state-owned enterprises in New Zealand. While state-owned enterprises in New 
Zealand  are commercial companies whose ownership happens  to be in the hands of  the 
government, public enterprises in Korea are more like the New Zealand government's busi- 
ness units. They are not allowed to pursue commercial objectives and are required by law to 
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vices in competition with private entrants. This is in sharp contrast to the 
comparable cases in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Second, the 
regulatory regime has not changed much from the days of government 
monopoly. Third,  omnipresent industrial policies, whose objectives are 
sometimes ambiguous, have allowed the government to intervene in  the 
industry extensively during the whole process. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to evaluate the deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry in Korea. I also attempt to explain why  the 
deregulation process has produced the outcomes it has. The analysis will 
also shed some light on how industrial policies affect competition policies 
in general in Korea. After summarizing major events in the deregulation 
process, I will  analyze the effects of several key  policies that have been 
employed by the Korean government, from the policy toward Korea Tele- 
com, to the policy on entry, rates, access charges, and the regulatory re- 
gime. I also discuss the industrial policy of promoting the equipment man- 
ufacturing industry. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 12.2 I summarize the his- 
tory of  the industry from government monopoly to its current state. In 
section 12.3 I evaluate the deregulation process and current policies to- 
ward the telecommunications industry in Korea. This section focuses on 
the effects of past and current policies regarding privatization, entry, rates, 
access charges, and the regulatory regime. Section 12.4 draws conclusions. 
12.2  An Overview of the Deregulation of the 
Telecommunications Industry in Korea 
Telephone services were provided by  the Ministry of  Communications 
(MOC) until  1980, when the government created a separate corporation 
to control telephone services. However, unlike the case of corporatization 
in New Zealand, this change was made as a restructuring effort within the 
government and had little to do with market-oriented reform. The re- 
sulting public enterprise, Korea Telecom (KT), was viewed  as a tool to 
execute the policies determined by MIC and not as a firm whose objective 
was to seek profits.2 MIC’s policy at the time was to accomplish universal 
service as quickly as possible. KT followed the directions given by  MIC 
and achieved universal service in record time. By  the end of the 198Os, KT 
had a monopoly in  the international,  domestic long-distance, and local 
exchange markets as well as in the mobile telephone market. However, KT 
was essentially a government business unit rather than a firm. 
serve public objectives. In practice, they are close to subsidiaries of the ministries that oversee 
the industries to which they belong. 
2. MOC changed its name to the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) in 
1996. To  avoid confusion, I will henceforth refer to MIC unless there is a need to use the 
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Table 12.1  International Telephone Tra5c and Sales of DACOM 
Measure  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Telephone traffic (thousand calls) 
Outbound  754  17,991  26,517  32,253  36,639 
Inbound  -  13,165  26,617  34,949  39,540 
Sales (hundred million won) 
Outbound  30  714  1,008  1,224  1,422 
Inbound  -  415  757  921  964 
Total revenue  30  1,129  1,765  2,151  2,386 
Outbound base  1  .o  21.2  26.7  27.2  25.9 
Market share (YO) 
Source: Ministry of Information and Communication, Annual Report of Electro Communica- 
rion (Seoul, 1996). 
In the early  1990s, MIC announced long-term plans to turn its tele- 
phone business into a privatized industry and, as a first step, allowed a 
private firm, DACOM, to enter the international telephone market. At 
first, DACOM leased most of the lines and other equipment needed to 
provide service from KT on favorable terms. Further, MIC set the rate of 
DACOM’s international telephone service substantially below KT’s rate. 
As shown in  table  12.1, DACOM quickly penetrated  the international 
market and captured a market share of around 25 percent in a relatively 
short period of time. DACOM’s international telephone traffic on the ba- 
sis of outbound calls increased by  13.6 percent compared with 1995. Sales 
also increased, by  10.9 percent. Over the past five years, rates for interna- 
tional calls have been  adjusted several times, resulting in a decrease in 
both the average rate level and the rate differential for the two operators. 
However, the rates have always been set by  MIC. 
On the mobile side, KT was forced to divest its mobile phone and pag- 
ing subsidiary, Korea Mobile Telephone (KMT) in  1994, when a control- 
ling interest was sold to one of the major chaebols, the Sunkyung Group.3 
KT has not been allowed to participate in the paging market since then 
and was barred from reentering the mobile telephone market until it ob- 
tained a personal communications services (PCS) license in summer 1996 
along with two other chaebols. During this period, MIC allowed one more 
cellular operator, Shinsegi Telecom Inc. (STI), to enter the market. STI 
was not able to provide service quickly mainly because MIC required as 
one of  the conditions of  its license that  STI use code division multiple 
access (CDMA) technology, which was still being developed. This require- 
ment not  only delayed the timing of  the entry by  STI into the mobile 
market but effectively reduced the size and profitability of entry, while it 
3. KMT recently changed its name to SK Telecom (SKT) to make it clear that it belongs 
to the Sunkyung Group. I will refer to SKT henceforth. 354  I1  Chong Nam 
prolonged SKT’s monopoly. In late 1996, STI finally began service, but it 
is still not effective in competing against SKT, which is allowed to use the 
old analog standard as well as CDMA technology. 
In 1996, MOC became the Ministry of Information and Communica- 
tion (MIC). It issued new licenses for several service areas in what was 
then viewed by many as the last big business opportunity of the twentieth 
century. Two  licenses for  PCS services were  granted to two consortia 
headed by two chaebols, Hansol and LG. The third went to a consortium 
controlled by  KT, Freetel. All three new operators were  required to use 
CDMA technology. None of the three has yet begun operations. In addi- 
tion, MIC allowed Onse, a consortium of many firms without a single 
controlling firm, to participate in the international market and allowed 
DACOM to enter the domestic long-distance market. Onse is still prepar- 
ing for its entry. DACOM started domestic long-distance service in early 
1997 but has been able to capture less than 10 percent of the market. 
Throughout these years, KT was treated essentially as a business unit 
of MIC even though MIC periodically announced its willingness to privat- 
ize KT and sold some KT shares to private investors in several tranches. 
Currently, the government owns 71.2  percent of  the shares; the rest are 
owned by a few institutional investors and a large number of small inves- 
tors. KT is  still subject to the Korea Telecom Act, which  specifies that 
KT’s objective is to achieve public goals and which gives MIC virtually 
unlimited power to intervene in the management of KT. This implies that 
KT does not have a profit incentive, nor does it have any incentive to 
speak against the decisions made by  MIC on issues that could have sig- 
nificant effects on KT, such as rates, access charges, conditions for leasing 
its facilities to its competitors, and so forth. Thus one cannot view KT as 
a competitor in any meaningful sense. 
Several aspects of the deregulation process attract attention. First, the 
government did not open major markets fully to anyone who wanted to 
participate but controlled the number of firms in each market and selected 
the entrants. In the international telephone market, it allowed only one 
entrant in 1991, maintained a duopoly until 1996, and then allowed one 
more entrant in 1996. In the domestic long-distance market, the govern- 
ment maintained the KT monopoly until 1996, when it allowed entry of 
only one firm, DACOM.4 The government maintained SKT’s monopoly 
on the mobile side as well, allowing only one more entrant in 1994 and 
three others in 1995. 
Second, in selecting new entrants, the government did not auction off 
licenses but instead employed complicated scoring systems. For instance, 
4.  DACOM was seen to be adversely affected by Onse’s entry into the international tele- 
phone market that it had shared with KT. The decision to allow DACOM to enter the do- 
mestic long-distance market appears to have been based partly on MIC’s concern about the 
profitability of DACOM. Onse has not started operation yet. Competition Policies for Telecommunications in Korea  355 
when MIC was selecting three PCS operators, it evaluated, among other 
things, the plausibility of business plans as well as the desirability of the 
applying consortia from a social standpoint. In effect, the government 
chose the firms that could participate in the market. In addition, the gov- 
ernment exercised strong influence on the governance structures of new 
entrants. Except in  selling shares of SKT and in allowing DACOM to 
enter the international market, the government forced potential entrants 
to form consortia consisting of many firms. 
Third, the government apparently intended to secure a portion of the 
markets for new entrants and safeguard their financial stability by using 
its control over KT and its strong rein on the industry, which is guaranteed 
by law. MIC’s rate regulation focused on maintaining rate differentials be- 
tween the incumbent and new entrants while at the same time preventing 
overall rate levels from falling to levels that would have been realized un- 
der full competition. Its policies toward access charges also appear to have 
been  biased in favor of new entrants. It appears that  the government’s 
intention was to create the industry configuration that it wanted rather 
than  let the market  decide. Thus the telecommunications  industry has 
multiple firms but is not subject to the forces of competition yet.5 
Fourth, and most important, MIC has been playing three different and 
conflicting roles: owner of KT, promoter of industrial policies for the tele- 
communications  industry and the related equipment manufacturing in- 
dustry, and regulator  of  the telecommunications  industry. As a conse- 
quence, KT has been run as an instrument of industrial policy rather than 
a profit-seeking firm. In addition, an independent regulatory framework 
has not surfaced yet. 
12.3  Evaluation of the Deregulation Process and Current Policies 
This section evaluates the effect of the deregulation process and current 
policies, which have not changed much from the early 1990s. Ever since 
the entry of DACOM into the international market, which started the 
deregulation process, rates have gone down and new services have become 
available. Many investors and firms who were able to participate in the 
newly created markets made handsome profits. For the business commu- 
nity, opportunities to catch a goose that is supposed to lay golden eggs 
came every two years. The government heralded the coming of the infor- 
5. One example that supports this conclusion is the apparent failure of DACOM to achieve 
superiority in efficiency. Although cost data are not released to the public, leaked pieces of 
information and the opinions of accountants in this area suggest that DACOM’s cost struc- 
ture is no better than that of  KT.  Several studies also point out that DACOM managers 
receive significantly higher salaries than their counterparts at KT. More generally, although 
not a public enterprise, DACOM is  believed by  most experts to have serious governance 
problems, due partly to the protective industrial policies of the government. 356  II Chong Nam 
mation age. Not surprisingly, there has not been much criticism from the 
general public of the deregulation process. 
However, lower rates and the introduction of new services by themselves 
are not enough when it comes to a telecommunications industry in which 
the relevant questions should be: By  how much should rates go down? 
How quickly should new services be introduced? How reliable are the ser- 
vices? Increases in social welfare from telecommunications come from two 
directions, technological innovation  and competition, which are them- 
selves positively correlated. The deregulation of the industry in Korea has 
not taken full advantage of the merits of competition. In fact, the deregu- 
lation process has had problems from the beginning, as I argue below. 
12.3.1  Policies toward Korea Telecom 
The government did not privatize KT as it introduced competition and 
has maintained KT as a means to achieve government policies. Since KT 
has been run as a subsidiary of MIC and has been denied profit incentives, 
it has had no reason to respond to the new environment. Thus the most 
important part of the market has been excluded from the forces of compe- 
tition. With no profit-oriented incentive plans and under a hierarchical 
structure as rigid and bureaucratic as the government itself, not many KT 
employees would attempt to improve the efficiency of their organization. 
The decision to keep KT as a vehicle of industrial policy when competi- 
tion was being introduced is in sharp contrast with the cases of the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand, which privatized British Telecom and Tele- 
com New Zealand, respectively, prior to the introduction of competition. 
The decision by  the Korean government not to privatize KT or to give 
KT a profit incentive reveals its perception of competition. The decision 
to keep KT as a vehicle of MIC policy goes directly against the goal of 
turning the telecommunications market from a government business into 
a competitive industry. DACOM’s entry into the international market in 
1991, without a change in  KT, signaled the start of  an era in which a 
competitive industry was handmade by the government. After six years of 
competition, KT is still not allowed to follow commercial objectives. 
12.3.2  Regulatory Regime 
As the government introduced competition in the telecommunications 
industry, a need arose for an independent regulatory body. However, no 
such body has been created. MIC was given the authority to oversee com- 
petition policies for the telecommunications industry while continuing all 
of its original functions. The realm of competition policies in the telecom- 
munications industry has not been clearly defined. This ambiguity has 
caused tensions between MIC and the Korean Fair Trade Commission. 
However, MIC was given the authority to draw up and execute the policies 
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It is also widely accepted within the government that MIC, and not the 
Fair Trade Commission, is primarily responsible for regulating anticom- 
petitive behavior by  telecommunications operators. Thus MIC has been 
playing the three different roles mentioned in section 12.2. 
As pointed out in section 12.2, MIC’s dual role as the owner of KT and 
competition authority could lead to conflicts of interests that jeopardize 
the performance of MIC in  both areas. The third function of MIC, to 
promote  industrial  policies, further  complicates  matters.  There  is  no 
agreement on what the industrial policies are for the telecommunications 
industry, even among bureaucrats.6 It appears that the government has 
chosen the following goals for its industrial policies: (1) making sure that 
each service is provided by multiple but not too many operators, (2) mak- 
ing sure that each firm has sufficient market share, (3) letting no firm lose 
money, (4) making Korean operators big enough to be able to compete 
with foreign operators once the Korean market opens to foreign opera- 
tors, (5) prohibiting any single party from claiming control of a major 
operator,’ and (6) helping related equipment manufacturing firms to be- 
come competitive in the world market. 
What are the policy variables? The policy variables that the government 
can employ in pursuing the above objectives include its control over entry, 
rates, access charges, conditions for operation, and technical  standards 
and its control over the management of KT as the majority shareholder. 
To  promote the equipment manufacturing industry, the government has 
been using its discretion in the choice of  technical standards and R&D 
subsidies. As one can easily see, some of the objectives of industrial poli- 
cies overlap with the objectives of competition policies. Further, some in- 
dustrial policy variables, such as the regulation of rates, access charges, 
entry, and operating conditions, are the same control variables that an 
independent competition authority would use to regulate the telecommu- 
nications industry. 
Consequently, the industrial policies of the government often conflict 
with its own competition policies. For instance, the government appar- 
ently saw  that giving DACOM  a certain market share within a certain 
period of time was desirable from the viewpoint of its industrial policy, so 
6.  This ambiguity surrounding industrial policies is not unique to the telecommunications 
industry. Generally, industrial policies for an industry are the policies pursued by the minis- 
try in charge of the industry. Often, what a ministry should pursue in an industry is not quite 
clear. Industry acts that empower the relevant ministries to intervene in an industry state the 
objectives of policies too generally. Typically, the acts only name “development of the indus- 
try” or “preventing disorder in markets” as the objective. As a consequence, the ministries 
in charge of specified industries enjoy wide discretion and tend to justify their policies or 
decisions by simply saying that they serve the objectives of industrial policies, which is some- 
what tautological. 
7. On this point, the government has been inconsistent in the past. While it applied this 
principle to DACOM and Onse, it permitted charbols to take controlling interests of mo- 
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it prohibited further entry and set rates in such a way that DACOM would 
achieve this goal. Another example involves the policies concerning verti- 
cal integration between the telecommunications and the equipment man- 
ufacturing industries. Up until  1996, when MIC issued PCS licenses to 
Hansol Telecom and LG Telecom, affiliated with the Hansol Group and 
the  LG Group,  respectively,  both  of  which  have  telecommunications 
equipment manufacturing subsidiaries, vertical integration in either direc- 
tion had been prohibited. 
The entry of Hansol and LG into the mobile market removed the ban 
on forward integration as a by-product. However,  the ban on backward 
integration remained. While the policy on vertical integration could have 
been used as a competition policy, it has been employed as an industrial 
policy, whose objective was to help some manufacturers. To this day, no 
explanation has been given  for the prohibition on backward integration 
that selectively applies only to carriers that did not previously have manu- 
facturing subsidiaries. An explanation, if provided, would be based at least 
partly on assessments of the possibility and the effects of foreclosure. 
Industrial policies will work well when the government has all the infor- 
mation about demand and the cost structure of each firm, as well as those 
of potential entrants, and uses the information to achieve the social opti- 
mum. In such an environment, the government will choose the right num- 
ber of firms and the best firms as participants, choose the optimal size for 
each firm, and set the most efficient rates and access charges. But this 
scenario is not about a competitive industry. Rather, it is closer to the old 
government  monopoly.  Of  course,  it  was  exactly  the  failure  of  the 
government-managed system that led to the transformation of  the tele- 
communications industry into a competitive one worldwide. By not estab- 
lishing an independent competition authority, the government has failed 
to create an environment that is consistent with competition in the tele- 
communications industry. 
Another characteristic of  industrial policies that deserves attention is 
that they frequently fail to distinguish between firms and their owners. 
When large projects are undertaken, they usually involve high sunk costs 
for which funds must be committed in the early stages of operation, before 
many uncertainties are realized.* However, at the time the uncertainties 
are realized, the sunk costs are no longer relevant and should not influence 
the decisions of the firm or the government. For instance, suppose that 
the government issues a firm a license to operate in the long-distance mar- 
ket, in which there are two incumbents, and that the entrant invests $100 
million in facilities that have no opportunity cost, once the investment is 
8. The telecommunications  industry is an example. Building a national network could 
involve huge costs, and a large part of them may not be of much value for other uses. Many 
network industries share this property. Competition Policies for Telecommunications in Korea  359 
made. Suppose also that the marginal cost of each firm is  substantially 
below the range of prices that would prevail as uncertainties about de- 
mand and other factors are realized once the entrant starts operation. In 
such an environment, all three firms will  operate and will earn positive 
economic profits in equilibri~rn.~ 
However, depending on the realization of the uncertainty, the entrant 
could find the realized profit significantly smaller than the opportunity 
cost of $100 million that was available before it committed itself to the 
facilities. If a large part of $100 million was financed by  borrowing, the 
entrant firm could even go bankrupt though it earns a positive economic 
profit after entry. In a well-functioning economy, this will not cause any 
problems. 
The firm will continue to operate because it is making a positive eco- 
nomic profit. Only the firm’s shareholders will take a loss on the unfortu- 
nate investment if  the firm can still pay the interest on borrowed capital. 
If the operating profit, before deducting interest payments, is smaller than 
the interest payments, banks too will have to take a loss. However, all these 
losses have nothing to do with economic efficiency and involve only the 
financial well-being of the shareholders and creditors. There is no reason 
for the firm to deviate from the level of operation in equilibrium. There is 
no need for the government to intervene either.1° 
However, industrial policies in  Korea  frequently call for government 
intervention when realized profits are smaller than the levels expected at 
the time of entry.lI A popular method used by the government is to limit 
competition and secure financial stability for the entrant.I2 The govern- 
ment claims that such interventions are necessary to ensure a strong do- 
mestic industry and sometimes goes as far as to say that they are necessary 
to induce competition in the industry in the long run, although such inter- 
vention only affects investors’ financial well-being and has no impact on 
efficiency in the post  entry game, as shown above. Limiting post entry 
competition may have an effect on the efficiency of investment prior to 
the entry decision. As potential entrants see that the government will help 
their profitability in the post entry game if the realization of uncertainties 
is unfavorable, they have incentives to overinvest. 
Such industrial policies have a long history in Korea. While interven- 
tionist industrial policies generally are fading in Korea, they started only 
9. This can be  shown in a noncooperative game model in  which firms first commit to 
investment under uncertainty and play a Cournot-type game with capacity constraints after 
the uncertainties are realized. 
10. Except possibly to reduce transactions  costs involved in reorganization  once insol- 
vency occurs. 
11. 1.e.. before the realization of uncertainties. 
12. Another widely used method is to force banks to ease the conditions on lending. This 
policy has been used extensively since the modernization drive started in the early 1960s and 
has resulted in huge problems for the financial sector. 360  I1  Chong Nam 
a few years ago in the telecommunications industry and are showing no 
signs of diminishing in either scope or strength. The remainder of this 
section will investigate in more detail the effects of the government’s poli- 
cies on the efficiency of the telecommunications industry in the areas of 
entry, rates, access charges, and vertical integration. 
12.3.3  Entry, Rates, and Access Charges 
The government’s  policy on entry can generally be characterized as “one 
entrant each time, guaranteed market shares and profitability.” Such a pol- 
icy is bound to affect not only entry itself but rates, access charges, and 
other relevant variables. Tables 12.2 and 12.3 below provide information 
about the rate regulation that has been applied to the international market 
since the entry by  the second carrier, DACOM. As shown in table 12.3, 
MIC initially set DACOM’s rates  5 percent lower on average than KT 
rates, reduced the differential to 3 percent  as DACOM’s market share 
came close to 30 percent, and reduced it again to 1 percent. 
In addition, MIC maintained rates for international call services at lev- 
els far higher than the standalone costs of providing them. This, combined 
with the asymmetric rate regulation explained above, enabled DACOM to 
secure the market share needed for profitable operation. 
Table 12.2  Sales Revenue and Market Share Trends (billion won) 
Company and Measure  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Korea Telecom 
Total sales revenue  4,487.6  4,907.6  5,389  6,361.5 
International services revenue  444.8  420.5  505  580.5 
International services market share (YO)  86  70.4  70  70.8 
Total sales revenue  227.5  325  345  369.8 
International services revenue  71.6  176.5  215  238.7 
International services market share (%)  14  29.6  30  29.2 
DACOM 
Source: Korea Information Society Development Institute. 
Table 12.3  Effect of Competition on International Service Price Index of 
Korea Telecom 
Measure  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
International service 
price index  190.32  140.05  129.02  129.02  129.02  104.32  104.32  100 
Price differential between 
Korea Telecom and 
-  ~  -  -  DACOM (%)  5  3  3  1 
Sources: Ministry of Information and Communication and Korea Telecom. Competition Policies for Telecommunications in Korea  361 
Table 12.4  Comparison of Long-Distance Call Rates (won per three minutes) 
Within 30 km  Within 100 km  Over 101 km 
Measure  DACOM  KT  DACOM  KT  DACOM  KT 
Basic rate  41.6  41.6  164  182.6  250  277.3 
Difference between rates (%)  -  11.3  10.8 
Source: DACOM. 
Table 12.4 shows the differences in call rates based on distance in the 
long-distance call service market. While the government has claimed that 
rate reductions became possible as a result of introducing competition, rate 
reductions were actually caused by its decisions about rates.13  There was no 
price competition since the rates for each firm were set by the government. 
It is also worth noting that the government forced KT to lease the facilities 
needed for DACOM’s rapid  expansion on favorable terms. Consumers 
also contributed to DACOM’s growth by paying higher rates. 
Rates of essentially all the major telecommunications services are set by 
MIC.l4 Traditionally, rates for international and domestic long-distance 
calls have been set at levels higher than the standalone costs of providing 
those services, and rates for local calls have been set lower than their ac- 
counting cost~.’~  Although no reliable figures are available, it is generally 
believed that the rate for local exchange service in Korea is substantially 
below those in the other OECD countries while the rates for international 
and domestic long-distance calls are significantly higher. As one can see 
from table 12.5, the ratio of the rate for a long-distance call to the rate for 
a local call in Korea is much higher than the ratios in other countries.16 
This suggests that the size of the subsidy from the long-distance market 
to the local exchange market is much larger in Korea than in the other 
countries. 
Considering that the rates for international and domestic long-distance 
calls are set by the government and that the government has maintained 
a rate differential between KT and DACOM, past and current rate policies 
13. The government could have made the rate reduction much bigger by  simply ordering 
KT to reduce rates without introducing DACOM into the market. 
14. MIC officially regulates only rates for services of dominant carriers. These consist of 
KT’s local exchange, domestic long-distance, and international calls and SKTS cellular calls. 
15. There is a subtle point in discussing costs of local calls. Accountants claim that they 
can separate the costs of local calls by  allocating joint costs to different services. However, 
their claim has little truth. If a cost is separable, it would not be a joint cost. However, one 
may say that KT’s local exchange operations are not profitable in the sense that if  its inter- 
national  and long-distance divisions had  no profits, KT would face a  big loss from its 
local exchange operations at current prices. 
16. Here the rate for a long-distance call made to destinations within 30 km is used as a 
proxy for the rate for a local call. 362  I1  Chong Nam 
Table 12.5  Differences in Telephone Rates Due to Distance 
United  United 
Korea  Kingdom  States  Japan  Germany  Australia 
Ratio“  7.8  1.4  1.4  4.5  3.0  3.0 
Source: Korea Information Society Development Institute. 
aRatio of long-distance call rates (over 101 km / within 30 km) in each country. 
must have created ample room for DACOM’s profit. Since DACOM took 
away a sizable portion of the lucrative market that used to subsidize the 
local exchange operation and other money-losing businesses required by 
the government, KT’s profit levels have been decreasing. 
On the mobile side, SKT has been enjoying a monopoly position aided 
by  the policy on technical standards that requires newcomers to use the 
CDMA system.I7 The rate regulation on SKT appears to have been more 
generous than the rate regulation on KT.I8 Although SKT is much smaller 
than KT in size and in the amount of capital initially invested, it earned 
greater  profits  than KT did  last  year.  Since the second mobile  carrier 
started operation this year and three more PCS operators are still in the 
preparatory stage, it is hard to discuss policies on mobile service rates. 
The final topic of our discussion of rate regulation is predatory pricing. 
The rationale  behind  the rate  regulation  described above, according to 
MIC, is the possibility of predatory pricing. In other words, MIC argues 
that if it does not set rates, the incumbent will set rates below costs and 
drive the new entrant out af the market. Predatory pricing is illegal ac- 
cording to Korean antitrust laws. Predatory pricing, if  found to have oc- 
curred, would be punished by the Korean Fair Trade Commission. Thus 
MIC’s rate policies, designed to prevent predatory pricing in advance, are 
somewhat ad hoc. In other oligopolistic industries, one would normally be 
more concerned about the possibility of collusion than that of predatory 
pricing. In our view, MIC’s rate regulation has more to do with its indus- 
trial policy goals than with the competition policy goal of preventing pred- 
atory pricing. 
17. SKT would have preferred the group special mobile standard, which is far better than 
CDMA in terms of the cost of investment and quality,  had there been no competitor in 
sight. But STI had obtained a license and was preparing to enter the mobile market. The 
government’s decision to allow only CDMA technology as the digital standard for mobile 
services would both delay STl’s entry and reduce the magnitude of its entry, in addition to 
increasing its costs. SKT  recognized that the benefits rrom the adoption by  the government 
of CDMA technology would  far outweigh the costs it would entail. Consequently, SKT 
actively advertised the need for the country to adopt the CDMA standard even though it 
would increase its own costs substantially. 
18. It is believed that regulation of SKT  has been generous because it is providing a new 
service that many view as a luxury good and also because there had been excess demand for 
quite a while. On the other hand, KT’s rates for local calls were much harder to raise due to 
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Let us now turn to the policy on access charges, probably the single 
most important factor in regulating the telecommunications industry. The 
nature of the access charge problem depends on the relationship between 
KT and the firm that wants to access KT’s local network. DACOM’s ser- 
vices are substitutes for the services provided by KT, while SKT’s services 
are by  and large complementary. By providing access to DACOM, KT 
loses revenue from its long-distance and international businesses. On the 
other hand, the mobile market is a market that neither SKT nor KT  can 
profit from alone. Consequently, KT and SKT are in a joint-venture bilat- 
eral monopoly situation in which each needs the other to take advantage 
of a new opportunity. 
MIC’s approach to access charges between DACOM and KT was ini- 
tially based on the retail tariff rate but changed to a fully distributed cost 
approach in  1994. On the other hand, MIC’s handling of access charges 
between KT and SKT has proved more difficult. Access charge settlement 
between KT and SKT was “bill and keep” initially. In 1993, however, MIC 
changed the rule and required that access charges be determined based on 
historical fully allocated cost, as between KT and DACOM since 1994, 
through its decree on interconnection. As the problem with this new rule 
became evident, MIC gave up this approach and has been trying to come 
up with yet another method.I9 As a consequence, KT and SKT have been 
giving access to each other in the land-to-mobile and mobile-to-land mar- 
kets without any agreement on how they settle on access charges. Table 
12.6 shows the trends of access charge rates between KT and SKT, STI, 
and DACOM. 
The problems with accounting-cost-based access charges are well known. 
They do not reflect true costs or demand conditions. Further, they leave too 
much to the arbitrariness of bureaucrats and accountants. In addition to 
these  general  problems,  MIC’s  access charge  policies  may  have  been 
affected by  its industrial policies favoring new entrants. Although much 
of the cost data are confidential, and the process of determining access 
charges is not open to the public, experts generally believe that charges 
have tended to favor firms other than KT. It is worth mentioning that no 
economic approach, such as an efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) 
or a global price cap, has been considered by the government thus far.2o 
Access charges between KT and SKT should be interpreted as a profit- 
sharing rule in a joint venture. However, MIC refused to accept this inter- 
pretation and chose to set access charges based on the accounting costs of 
providing access services. In the early stage, when accounting-cost-based 
19. The problem is explained below. The explanation will provide a good example of how 
wrong accounting-cost-based access charges can be. 
20. ECPR and its properties are well summarized in Baumol and Sidak (1995), Econom- 
ides and White (1995), and Laffont and Tirole (1996). Laffont and Tirole (1996) also suggest 
an approach that can be viewed as a generalization of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing. Table 12.6  Access Charge Rate Trends (wonlminute) 
SKT  DACOM 
STI 
Year  Type"  Land to Mobile  Mobile to Land  Land to Mobile  Type  Interconnection 
1992 
1993 
1994  Local  13.33 
Long distance  49.42 
1995  Type A  Undecided 
Type B  Undecided 
Type c 
1996  Type A  22.52 















Local  26.34 
Long distance  45.03 
13.27  Long distance  25.02 
23.67  International  25.08 
Source: Marketing Division of Korea Telecom 
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Table 12.7  Estimates of Korea Telecom’s Access Charge Revenue, 1996 
Access Charge (hundred million won) 
Charge for  Charge for  NTS Share of Expenses  Ratio of Share 
Local  Long-Distance  Compensating  of Expenses 
Company  Call  Call  Deficits”  Total  to Sales (YO) 
KT 
Long distance  4,116  0  4,970  9,086  58.75 
International  87  116  107  310  4.33 
Long distance  525  490  Exemption  1,015  41.08 
International  25  33  30  88  3.34 
SKT  453  497  556  1,506  5.96 
STI  24  38  Exemption  62  4.65 
Total  5,230  1,174  5,663  12,067  22.20 
DACOM 
Source: Marketing Division of Korea Telecom. 
”Non-traffic-sensitive (NTS) expense can roughly be  understood  as the cost of providing universal 
service. 
access charges  were  being  studied,  KT and SKT did  not  pay  access 
charges and simply used the bill-and-keep method, as directed by  MIC. 
This way  of settlement was biased in  favor of SKT because most calls 
were made from mobile to land. The new way of settlement based on the 
accounting cost of providing access, introduced in 1993, defined both KT 
and SKT as providers of access services and dictated that each firm receive 
from the other an access charge equal to the average accounting cost of 
providing access. 
However, SKT’s average accounting cost of providing the access to KT 
needed to complete a land-to-mobile call turned out to be higher than the 
rate for a call. Thus KT, as a seller of land-to-mobile call services, was to 
pay more in access charges than it receives as the price for its service.*’ 
SKT and KT are currently negotiating yet another way of settling access 
charges. 
Table  12.7 summarizes  estimated  access charges  for  KT,  DACOM, 
SKT, and STI for 1996. The low ratios of access charges paid to revenue 
for DACOM and SKT seem to confirm our claim about access charges.22 
21. This may be interpreted as an example of how arbitrary an accounting approach can 
be. SKT’s cost of providing access services can vary widely depending on the way it allocates 
costs of capital investment, etc. It also seems that accountants have considerable discretion 
in qualifying acceptable costs. 
22. The ratio of the access charges paid by DACOM to its revenues from the international 
market is extremely low, compared to those of long-distance carriers in the United States, 
whch range from 40 to 50 percent. The ratio for SKT is also significantly lower than ratios 
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12.3.4  Vertical Integration 
The current policy on vertical integration, allowing forward integration 
by  equipment manufacturers while prohibiting backward integration by 
carriers, seems to have no economic basis. There is little possibility that 
KT, DACOM, or SKT could become a dominant firm in manufacturing 
even if backward integration were allowed. Thus the expected loss of effi- 
ciency from vertical foreclosure effects that may arise when these carriers 
are allowed to integrate backward appears insignificant. 
On the other hand, from the past behavior patterns of chaebols, it is 
highly probable that LG Telecom and Hansol Telecom will purchase most 
of  their  equipment from the telecommunications  equipment manufac- 
turing subsidiaries of LG Group and Hansol Group, respectively, thus 
foreclosing  a  substantial  portion  of  the  markets  both  upstream  and 
downstream. Thus the current policy on vertical integration regulates the 
backward  integration  whose expected harm to the economy is smaller 
than the expected harm of the forward integration by nonregulated manu- 
facturers. 
Another industrial policy pursued by MIC deserves attention when dis- 
cussing the vertical relationship between the telecommunications industry 
and the equipment manufacturing industry. MIC has been playing a key 
role in  subsidizing the equipment manufacturing industry through  the 
R&D programs of service providers downstream. The policy, supported 
by law, requires telecommunications operators to spend a certain percent- 
age of their revenues on R&D, a large part of which has supported R&D 
in telecommunications equipment, but does not allow them to commer- 
cialize the results. This policy has the effect of taxing services and giving 
the tax revenue to the R&D part of the equipment manufacturing industry. 
Before, when vertical integration in both directions was prohibited, the 
only issue surrounding the policy was the effect on consumers in the tele- 
communications market  and the effectiveness of the subsidy in helping 
equipment manufacturers to gain competitiveness in the world market for 
telecommunications equipment. However, the entry by  LG and Hansol 
led  to the possibility that  the carriers that are not vertically integrated 
would subsidize their competitors that  are vertically integrated.  Such a 
subsidy will undoubtedly distort competition in the telecommunications 
industry. 
12.4  Basis for Reform 
As the above discussions demonstrate, deregulation of the telecommu- 
nications industry in Korea has been severely constrained by the industrial 
policies of the government. As a result, effective competition among carri- Competition Policies for Telecommunications in Korea  367 
ers seeking profits in a noncooperative way has yet to occur. As long as 
the present regulatory framework prevails, loss of allocative efficiency as 
well as internal efficiency of the carriers will continue. 
If a more efficient, low-cost telecommunications sector is to be achieved, 
changes in the structure of incentives facing the management of KT are 
necessary. Privatizing KT would be the best way to achieve this goal. How- 
ever, privatization could prove to be a long process, as the history of priva- 
tization efforts in Korea shows. Thus, before full privatization takes place, 
it is important that KT be run as a profit-seeking entity even while the 
government remains a large shareholder. 
One way of giving proper profit incentives to KT would be to separate 
the ownership role of the government from the regulatory role and estab- 
lish an independent authority for the telecommunications industry, similar 
to the Office of Telecommunications in the United Kingdom or the Fed- 
eral Communications Commission in the United States. The regulatory 
body would then be charged with regulation of entry, rates, and access 
charges and other related issues such as universal service. 
For mobile telecommunications, an alternative  to the present  policy 
would be to sell the spectrum, letting an auction determine who could 
most profitably and efficiently enter the market. For the wired markets, 
further relaxation of entry regulation may lead to improvement in alloca- 
tive efficiency, at least in the long-distance markets. 
Reform of regulation on rates and access charges is a complex issue. 
Factors to be considered include the restructuring of rates to minimize 
cross-subsidies and, at the same time, the provision of a rate structure that 
would yield an adequate return when firms are efficient. There also are 
issues with regard to the allocation of access charges to be divided among 
KT and mobile operators. 
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Comment  Ramonette B. Serafica 
The basic argument of the paper is that telecommunications  policies in 
Korea have not created a competitive industry. I1  Chong Nam supports 
this contention by discussing various forms of government intervention. 
In particular,  several instances of how the Ministry  of Information and 
Communications (MIC) has stepped in to influence market outcomes di- 
rectly are described. Such an open and honest account of the extent of 
government intervention  is not found in most papers, so the author de- 
serves credit for sharing this information. 
To  create a more complete and balanced  view  of the Korean reform 
program, however, Nam could give some background on the government’s 
motivation  for opening up the market. It would  be useful to know, for 
example, what the impetus was for the reform of the sector. Was it due to 
the immense dissatisfaction of consumers with the old system, or a change 
in some national or industrial policy goal, or is it simply a response to the 
changing technologies? What is the rationale for deregulation? Based on 
the author’s discussion, one is inclined to believe that regulation is driven 
by  industrial  policies. It would therefore help to know  what the actual 
policy pronouncements of the government are with respect to telecommu- 
nications. Thus a discussion of (1) what triggered telecommunications de- 
regulation and (2) what is driving it forward should help the reader gain a 
view of the forest that is the Korean telecommunications reform program. 
After reading through the paper one is convinced that there is indeed a 
lot of room for the introduction of competitive forces in the industry. Act- 
ing as regulator,  promoter of industrial policies, and owner of the dom- 
inant firm, MIC has been  able to use its powers to carve  out an envi- 
ronment  that  guarantees  results  rather  than  the  mere  opportunity  to 
participate in such a dynamic industry. If this is true, then there is certainly 
the danger that such a low-powered incentive structure will not encourage 
optimal behavior from the privileged few. 
A case in point is the policy on market entry, which Nam describes as 
“one entrant each  time,  guaranteed  market  shares  and profitability.” I 
agree with the author that it is only with perfect information on cost and 
demand conditions that a central planner  has any chance of accurately 
determining the best candidate. However, as we all know, such a situation 
does not exist. In fact, as economists have always maintained,  it is the 
process of competition that is the most efficient “discovery procedure” for 
eventually separating the winners from the losers.’ 
Of course, there is some merit in ensuring the economic viability of new 
Ramonette B.  Serafica is  associate professor  of economics at De La Salk  University, 
1. Snow (1997) provides a good discussion of the debate regarding natural monopoly vs. 
Manila. 
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entrants. It reduces their risks and encourages investment  in the sector. 
But even as a select few are chosen, competitive forces can be introduced 
into the selection process by adopting competition jur the market instead 
of competition in the market. Through a bidding process, the candidate 
that offers the best combination of price, quality, and product variety is 
chosen to enter the market first. Phasing of licenses can then be used as a 
stick to discipline an erring operator and as a carrot to entice prospective 
entrants to offer better, more innovative packages of services as a condi- 
tion for entry.2 This option may be explored as an alternative to the cur- 
rent system. 
It must be noted  that the case for asymmetric regulation in favor of 
entrants has been stressed in other countries. The British and U.S. experi- 
ences show that initial support for entrants was necessary in order to cre- 
ate a credible competitive environment. Based on the actions of MIC per- 
haps the interventions  are aimed at creating a competitive industry, and 
thus it may be premature for Nam to declare “that telecommunications 
policies in Korea have not created a competitive industry.” The fact that 
rates have gone down and that new services have become available in inter- 
national long distance reveals that slowly competition is taking root. As I 
have said, the author has done a good job of convincing me of the enor- 
mous potential for the introduction of competitive forces in Korean tele- 
communications. As a next step, the author may want to look at how other 
countries have managed to help new firms in the name of creating a level 
playing field and still been able to promote efficiency in the process. 
The contribution  of government  or government-run  operators in the 
development of telecommunications networks should also not be totally 
disregarded. I think that government-run post, telegraph, and telephones 
(PTTs) were successful in achieving universal  service in some countries 
(and thus government was able to correct a potential market failure under 
a private monopoly situation). Even Nam acknowledges that this is true 
for Korea, and chapter  11 on Taiwan can attest to this fact as well. In 
addition, it  is incorrect  to claim  that  “it was exactly the failure of  the 
government-managed  system that led to the transformation  of the tele- 
communications industry into a competitive one worldwide.” In fact, the 
single most important impetus for the transformation of the telecommuni- 
cations industry into a competitive one is the change in the cost structure 
of providing telecommunications services attributable to technological in- 
novation. Thus “failure of the government-managed system” can perhaps 
explain the return of PTTs to the private sector, but it is technology that 
makes competition possible. 
Finally, in the last section of the paper, Nam makes several recommen- 
dations for restructuring the regulatory framework for the industry. Given 
2. See Glynn’s (1994) proposal 370  I1  Chong Nam 
the complexity of telecommunications, it would be impossible to provide 
an adequate treatment of the subject matter in one paper (much less one 
section of  a  paper).  As  a  guide, the  International  Telecommunication 
Union lists the following as important elements of telecommunications 
policy, regulation, and legislation: 
1. Market structure: What are the monopoly services and which ones 
can be provided under competition? 
2.  Ownership of operating entities: What is the extent of private sector 
participation and of foreign participation? 
3. Conditions and rules of market entry and exit: What are the obliga- 
tions of operating entities, technical standards, rules for interconnection, 
mechanisms for entry, and so forth? 
4. Pricing principles and cost recovery guidelines: What are guidelines 
for monopoly and competitive services, allowable rates of return and so 
forth? 
5.  Institutional  roles: What  are the location  of authority,  the process 
to establish policy, and the process to monitor and enforce compliance 
with policy? 
Each of these elements needs to be thoroughly studied, individually and 
in conjunction with the other aspects, in order to come up with a complete 
and coherent reform program for telecommunications. 
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